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The political influence of big business is usually divided into intentional and 
structural categories (Bernhagen and Bräuninger 2005, pp. 43-46; Lindblom 1977, pp. 
193-194; Offe 1985, pp. 170-220).  Structural influence refers to the dependence of 
the state on the capitalist economy.  Intentional influence, which is our focus, takes 
the form of lobbying by business to obtain policy benefits.  
 
A useful way of analysing lobbying is to distinguish between different actors.  For 
example, on the firm’s side, there are big differences between the lobbying activities 
of business associations, political consultants and the efforts of senior management 
themselves (Wilson 1990).  On the state’s side, there are similarly important 
differences between such actors as bureaucrats, ministers, and parliamentarians.  
Surprisingly, the political party remains a relatively understudied actor in business-
government relations.  Indeed, there is very little systematic literature on the 
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relationship between the two key organisations of capitalism and representative 
democracy: the firm and the political party.  Moreover, we argue that the scant 
existing literature is of limited utility in understanding this vital relationship because it 
fails to consider a critical feature of party-firm relations: the exclusivity and duration 
of ties between them.  Exclusivity, an enduring association between a firm and a 
single political party, is either ignored or examined in a parochial framework. 
 
We consider exclusivity at a point in time and exclusivity over time.  Does a firm 
have a relationship with only one party at a given point in time, or is it close to more 
than one party?  Does a firm maintain a relationship with only one party over time, or 
does it switch between parties?  Most importantly, how do patterns of exclusivity 
impact on a firm’s ability to lobby successfully?1  We find that patterns of exclusivity 
are important predictors of lobbying success by big business and are therefore vital to 
understanding the political economy of capitalist democracies. 
 
Critique of the Literature 
Useful accounts of the relationship between parties and firms could potentially be 
found in three large overlapping literatures relating to business-government relations, 
corruption and political finance.  Before presenting our own theory, we examine each 
in turn.   
 
The bulk of the literature on business-government relations has been dominated by 
studies of the activities of business associations (Greenwood and Jacek 2000; 
Sadowski and Jacobi 1991; Schmitter and Streeck 1981) and of individual 
corporations (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 2004; Martin 2000; Salisbury 1984).  A 
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sophisticated literature concentrates on how businesses choose between or combine 
corporate and associational lobbying strategies (Bennett 1999; Coen 1997).  Grant’s 
work has taken parties seriously but he makes no mention of exclusivity (Grant 1993, 
pp. 13-18; Grant, Martinelli, and Patterson 1989). 
 
Rose-Ackerman has summarised and set the agenda for much of the work on 
corruption.  Her treatment of parties is not explicit, lasts only a couple of pages and 
does not consider the exclusivity of relationships between firms and parties (Rose-
Ackerman 1999, pp. 128-132).  Given the influence of Rose-Ackerman in defining 
the orthodox political economy approach to the study of corruption, it is not surprising 
that the burgeoning literature follows her in concentrating on policies and institutions 
rather than parties (Gerring and Thacker 2004; Gerring and Thacker 2005; Montinola 
and Jackman 2002; Persson and Tabellini 2003, pp. 187-202).  An important literature 
probably subsumes parties into the variable “political competition”, but such studies 
never explicitly treat parties, much less the nature of their relations with firms 
(Hellman 1998; Hopkin 1997, p. 261).  Of the handful of systematic treatments of 
parties and corruption, one does not even mention firms (Hopkin 1997) while  another 
makes only a passing comment to suggest that in Italy firms’ relations with parties 
tended to be exclusive (Della Porta 2004, p. 51).   
 
In turn, the literature on political finance somewhat compensates for the tendency of 
the business-government relations and corruption literatures to ignore party-firm 
relations.  However, this literature generally also does not consider the dynamics of 
party-firm ties, or raise the issue of the exclusivity of relations.  For example, it is not 
mentioned in a recent comparative review of the literature (Fisher and Eisenstadt 
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2004).  However, many studies of political finance in the USA do explicitly test for 
exclusivity (Burris 2001, pp. 362-363, 378).  However, this research is mostly 
confined to the subject of Political Action Committees, which is particular to the US 
context (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998).  This literature also makes no attempt 
to theorise beyond the singular political system of the United States.  Nonetheless, its 
concentration on firm’s calculations about the likely winners of elections shares a 
central intuition with the theoretical framework that we introduce in the next section. 
   
Theorizing Party-Firm Ties 
We begin with a typology of party-firm relations.  From the firm’s point of view, the 
best relationship with political parties could conceivably be any of the following: 
• Abstinence. In this case, firms refrain from developing an association with any 
political party. 
• Marriage.  Firms are associated with a single political party. 
• Polygamy. Firms are simultaneously associated with competing political 
parties. 
• Serial monogamy. Firms are associated with a single political party at a given 
point in time, but switch from party to party over time. 
 
Clearly, these relationships should have important consequences for firms, which will 
choose the relationship most likely to deliver them benefits.  Moreover, these different 
relationships should have important implications for public policy.  If marriage is the 
dominant party-firm relationship, then the economy is substantially assimilated into 
the party system, and will be subject to massive changes every time the government 
changes. If serial monogamy is the dominant relationship the economy will not be 
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hugely affected by the electoral cycle. If polygamy is the dominant strategy, there 
should be even greater continuity in policy. 
 
All other things being equal, parties should always prefer marriage.  This relationship 
allows them the benefit of a relationship with firms, while denying these benefits to 
competing parties.  The most obvious benefit is funding, but information, legitimacy, 
policy implementation, jobs, etc. can also be desirable from a party’s point of view.  
In this article, we concentrate on the firm’s perspective.  We will now present a model 
of the basic incentives facing businesses considering relationships with political 
parties. 
 
Our model consists of the interaction between the basic institutions of democracy and 
the pattern of party political competition.  We make two assumptions that should 
apply to virtually every capitalist democracy. First, there must be sufficient “narrowly 
focused favours available for distribution by politicians” (Rose-Ackerman 1999, p. 
132).  While there is probably considerable variation in the extent to which such 
favours are available, it is hardly possible to think of a capitalist democracy where 
narrowly based favours are so unavailable that large firms have no incentive to 
develop political contacts.  Clearly, however, in the event that this assumption did not 
hold, firms would not be associated with parties.  Second, at least some members of 
two or more competing political parties must be willing to grant such favours.  This 
also seems like an assumption that holds for virtually any capitalist democracy.  Even 
in systems where one party is seen as more pro-business on broad issues, there is 
frequently much less, or even no, difference between parties as regards narrowly 
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focused favours (Burris 2001, p. 378).  Of course, if this assumption turned out to be 
false, we expect that firms would be exclusively associated with one party. 
 
Our first independent variable is party competition.  Using the competitiveness of a 
party system as an independent variable is common (Grzymała-Busse 2003; Hellman 
1998).  Our stress on competition and predictability is less usual but does echo Rose-
Ackerman’s approach to bribery (Rose-Ackerman 1999, p. 132). We distinguish 
between predictable and unpredictable party systems.  A party system is unpredictable 
if during an electoral campaign it is difficult to predict which party or parties will 
control the institutions at stake.  In some systems, this is a simple matter of election 
results.  In others, predictability also includes coalition formation.  We distinguish 
between two types of predictable systems.  If there is a dominant party, during an 
electoral campaign it can relatively confidently be predicted that the incumbent party 
or parties will win.  If there is alternation, it can relatively confidently be predicted 
that the opponents of the incumbents will win.   
Our second independent variable is the basic institutional design of a democracy.  We 
distinguish between divided and fused political institutions. This distinction has much 
in common with the literature on ‘divided government’ (Elgie 2001), which, in 
contrast to our approach, does not consider territorial divisions, and the more general 
concept of ‘divided power’, which, in contrast to our approach, does not consider 
divisions within one institution (Lijphart 1999, p. 5).  If institutions are fused, at a 
given point in time, there will be only one relevant partisan configuration.  If 
institutions are divided there will be more than one relevant partisan configuration.  
The division of institutions can be functional and/or territorial.  If functional 
institutions are divided then different parties or coalitions are likely to control 
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constitutionally separate institutions, such as the executive versus the legislature or 
different houses of the legislature.  If territorial institutions are divided the party or 
parties controlling national institutions are likely to be different from those controlling 
significant institutions at the sub-national level.  In parliamentary unitary states, 
institutions are usually fused.  In presidential and decentralised states, institutions are 
usually divided.   
 
Combinations of the three party systems and two broad institutional configurations 
present very different incentives for businesses seeking to interact with political 
parties.  If there is an unpredictable party system, regardless of the configuration of 
institutions, businesses will choose polygamy.  They will associate with all substantial 
political parties because all substantial political parties have a serious chance of 
exerting regular control over policy-making institutions.  If there is a dominant party, 
again regardless of the configuration of institutions, businesses will choose 
exclusivity.  One party (or coalition) has such dominance that it will usually win 
control of electoral institutions, regardless of differences in the timing, constituency, 
electoral system and purpose of elections.  In the alternation scenario, institutions 
matter.  If institutions are fused, businesses will choose serial monogamy.  One party 
or coalition will control all important institutions at any given time.  If institutions are 
divided, businesses will choose polygamy.  Electoral dominance at a point in time, 
will not translate into a monopoly of institutions.  The division of institutions will 
ensure that opposing parties or coalitions control different policy-making institutions 
at any point in time.  Table One summarises our theory. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Party-Firm Ties in Poland 
The rest of this article is a ‘case study’, by which we mean an in-depth study of one 
country through which we aim to elucidate the relationship between firms and parties 
in capitalist democracies (Gerring 2004, p. 341).  Using a survey of the leadership of 
Poland’s largest firms, we test whether our theory can correctly predict the most 
successful relationship for firms.  Obviously, a single case study cannot confirm a 
theory.   Nonetheless, single case studies are useful for the initial exploratory theory-
generating stage of research (Gerring 2004, pp. 349-350).  We argue that Poland is 
not particularly unusual in any sense that would affect the ability of our model to 
operate in other contexts.  Thus, a successful test in the Polish context should 
establish our theory as a promising hypothesis for capitalist democracy in general. 
 
Poland clearly fulfils the two assumptions of our theory.  First, there is abundant 
quantitative and qualitative evidence of a plentiful supply of narrowly focused favours 
for business (Drąg 1999; Jasiecki 2001; Kloc 1998).  Second, it is clear that more than 
one party is willing to distribute such favours.  The Polish party system has been 
relatively weakly structured around economic policy.  Moreover, differences in 
economic policy have not necessarily been associated with different attitudes to 
business.  The ‘left-wing’ Social Democratic Alliance (SLD) has also been ‘a party of 
business’ (Bielasiak 2001; Jasiecki 2001; Szawiel 1999).  At the time of our survey, 
the senior partner in government was the ‘right-wing’ Solidarity Electoral Action, 
which was ‘pro-reform’ but also ‘pro-union’ and which quickly gained a reputation 
for its willingness to distribute favours to business.  Its junior partner was the 
‘centrist’ and firmly pro-business Freedom Union. 
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Next, we examine our two independent variables, political institutions and the party 
system.  Poland’s political institutions are largely fused, but there is some potential 
for divided institutions.  Poland is a semi-presidential regime, according to Elgie’s 
definition, in that it has a directly elected president and a prime minister responsible 
to parliament (Elgie 1998).  The cabinet has dominated executive policy-making.  
This conclusion applies relatively uncontroversially to the period of the amended 
communist constitution (1989-1992), the “Little Constitution” (1992-97) and the 
current constitution (1997 onwards).  The 1997 Constitution substantially decreased 
the president’s powers (Sanford 2002, pp. 141-147; Siaroff 2003, pp. 300-307).  His 
powers have been concentrated on defence and foreign affairs, issues which are of 
little relevance to party-firm relations.  The exception is the power of legislative veto, 
which, since 1997, can be overridden by a sixty per cent majority of the lower house.  
The veto has been an effective instrument for the president (Wołek 2004, pp. 150-
151) and business associations have lobbied for him to use it in their interests.  
However, the laws at stake have not constituted the sort of narrowly focused favours, 
which structure party-firm relations (Balicki 2001, pp. 144-146).   
 
A divided executive under semi-presidentialism is known as cohabitation.  
Ambiguities regarding the party affiliation of some cabinets and the second president 
make it difficult to straightforwardly calculate the length of time under cohabitation in 
Poland.  Nonetheless, we estimate that cohabitation accounts for approximately half 
of the post-communist period.2  The period of our survey was one of unambiguous 
cohabitation.  
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Another potential source of divided government is minority government.  In Poland, 
there have been minority governments from October 1991 to October 1993; from June 
2000 to October 2001; and from March 2003 to the present.  The period of our survey 
was one of majority government. 
 
We do not consider regional and local institutions as a potential source of divided 
government in Poland.  Early reforms in Poland did decentralise power but only in 
comparison with the hyper-centralised communist system.  Some management 
functions were delegated but virtually no fiscal control (Thurmaier 1994).  Before 
1999, regional and local governments in Poland accounted for an even lower 
proportion of public spending than their counterparts in other East-Central European 
countries (Brusis 2003).  There was a significant reform of local and regional 
government in 1999, but even after that date it is still accurate to describe Poland as a 
centralised state (Kerlin 2002; McMenamin 2004, p. 269).  Brusis notes an increase in 
the proportion of public spending attributed to devolved institutions after 1999.  
However, this increase was almost entirely the result of a virtually simultaneous 
healthcare reform (Brusis 2003, pp. 158-159), in which health spending was devolved 
to institutions relatively independent of politicians (McMenamin and Timonen 2002, 
pp. 109-110).   
 
Post-communist Poland’s party system can be classified as alternating, with a 
significant element of unpredictability. No government has been re-elected and, 
although parties on the right and in the center have often been short-lived, there has 
been a stable division between ‘center-right’ and ‘peasant-left’ blocs. Moreover, the 
division of the party system has been such that a party from the left, such as the SLD, 
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could never form a coalition with a party form the center-right, such as the liberal 
Freedom Union.  The results of the 1993 and 2001 elections were both predictable, in 
terms of the largest parties and the resulting coalition government.  The 1991 election 
was clearly unpredictable in both party and governmental terms.  The 2005 election 
was predictable in terms of the largest parties, but what seemed to be a relatively 
firmly agreed coalition deal, collapsed in post-electoral negotiations.  The 1997 
election was too close to call in terms of the largest parties, but given the election 
results, the resulting coalition was predictable.  Our survey was conducted less than a 
year after this election.  
 
Poland’s institutions are generally fused, albeit with some level of division.   Its party 
system generally alternates, albeit with some level of unpredictability.  This general 
conclusion holds both for the time at which our survey was conducted and for the 
subsequent period.  Therefore, our theory predicts that serial monogamy, where party 
affiliation switches over time, should have been the best relationship for Polish firms.   
 
Having assessed Poland in terms of our model, we briefly address two general country 
characteristics that merit consideration before presenting our data in the next section.  
First, one might object that Poland’s status as a ‘new democracy’ and a post-
communist state make it an implausible case from which to generalise.  However, , 
Poland is very close to the median age of today’s democracies.  More importantly, 
there does not seem to be any reason why newness should preclude the importance of 
our institutional and party-system variables. Second, it might be argued that new 
democracies are less predictable, but the predictability of a party system is already 
taken into account by our classification.  Post-communist capitalist democracies are 
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obviously outnumbered by never-communist capitalist democracies.  However, again 
there seems to be no reason why our institutional and party-system variables would 
not apply to post-communist systems. Since the post-communist context affects the 
behaviour of individual firms in many ways, we have included controls for the 
relevant aspects of post-communism in our analysis of the Polish survey data. 
 
Measures 
The following case study is quantitative.  We follow Gerring’s definition of a case 
study as relating to single unit rather than a particular way of studying that unit 
(Gerring 2004, p. 342).  Given the number and diversity of large businesses it would 
be very difficult to avoid unacceptable bias in a qualitative study claiming to represent 
party-firm relations at a national level.  However, qualitative knowledge is prior to 
quantitative knowledge, in that a researcher must know what to measure and how to 
measure it (Sartori 1970).  Thus, we will briefly present some examples of how our 
theory can accommodate the relationships between parties and some of Poland’s 
biggest and best-known firms.   
 
The most obvious example of successful serial monogamy is Jan Kulczyk. He is 
Poland’s richest and most diversified businessman (Wprost 2004) and was  closely 
tied to the right while in power from 1991 to 1993 and from 1997 to 2001.  He 
repeatedly won massively lucrative contracts from them as well as favourable 
privatisation deals.  Under the left-wing government from 2001 to 2005, he was again 
associated with government.  A left-wing journalist dubbed the prime minister 
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‘Kulczyk’s mannequin’.  Investigations into a spectacular corruption scandal under 
the same government uncovered an allegation that he claimed to have decisive 
influence with the President (Sejm Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej 2005).  Ryszard Krauze 
of Prokom Software has brazenly shifted from left to right and back to the left again, 
in order to maintain his profits from public procurement, most notably the 
computerization of the Social Insurance Administration (Butkiewicz, Indulski, and 
Ryciak 2004).  The battles of PGNiG and Aleksander Gudzowaty to protect their gas 
pipeline from right-wing politicians angered by their association with the left 
demonstrate the perils of marriage.  Indeed, this issue has once again become a 
priority of the current right-wing government. 
 
While the above evidence suggests our theory is applicable to Poland, we repeat our 
belief that that qualitative evidence of party-firm relations in Poland cannot generalize 
to the political system as a whole.  In previous qualitative interviews, conducted 
independently of each other, but based on quite similar samples, we reached different 
conclusions (McMenamin 2004, pp. 671-672; Schoenman 2005).  The obvious 
remedy is a quantitative approach.  We emphasise that our quantitative analysis 
endeavours to take account of the subtleties of Polish business-government relations 
so as to provide a useful test of our general theory. 
 
Our data comes from an elite survey carried out in Poland in the summer of 1998 by 
the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (Wasilewski 
1999).    300 presidents and vice-presidents of the executive board were selected from 
the lists of the 500 biggest Polish firms published by Polityka (quality weekly) and 
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Gazeta Bankowa (equivalent of the Financial Times).  The response rate was 64.6 per 
cent.   
 
The survey included a list of twenty-two of Poland’s most powerful politicians at the 
time (see Appendix).  Respondents were asked to rate how well they knew each of the 
politicians.  We use these responses to construct measures of our typology of 
relationships.  Our direct approach to personal acquaintance (Heinz et al. 1993; 
Kadushin 1995) has obvious advantages over the more indirect approach which looks 
for common past or present membership of institutions (Scott, Stokman, and Ziegler 
1985).  Our research reveals strategic relationships, following Padgett and Ansell’s 
research on marriage and lending in Medici Florence (Padgett and Ansell 1993), and 
McLean’s study of elite marriages in early modern Poland (McLean 2004).  The 
relationships that we study are mainly instrumental and it would be difficult to argue 
that business leaders and political leaders become acquainted in a search for 
companionship.  Another question in our survey asking whether respondents knew a 
national politician suggests that the responses to the more detailed question are 
reliable.   
 
An alternative approach is to use political contributions by businesses as a measure of 
association.  As discussed above, this has been done very successfully in the 
American literature on Political Action Committees, which uses official records.  The 
validity of such a measure depends on the assumptions that data is available and that 
most contributions are legal.  The USA is very unusual in being able to fulfill both 
these assumptions.  It is also possible to ask about political contributions in a survey.  
Our survey asked such a question and it was the only one to meet with a wholesale 
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refusal to answer.  Moreover, in qualitative interviews we have conducted with post-
communist business elites in Poland and elsewhere it was frequently impossible to 
obtain a response on political funding.  The Business Environment and Enterprise 
Survey conducted by the World Bank does ask such a question but the absence of 
information on responses rate raises questions about the validity and reliability of this 
data (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000).  Also, this survey does not discriminate 
between different political parties. 
 
Those who did not report knowing any of the politicians were classified as abstinent.  
To distinguish between the other types of relationships, we created an index of 
‘exclusivity’, which aims to distinguish those with connections concentrated on one 
party, or a number of parties, from those with equally good connections across the 
political spectrum.   This measure was calculated as follows: 
• The number of politicians in the left (seven), right (seven) center (five) and 
peasant (three) groups known by each respondent was calculated.  ‘Knows 
very well’, ‘knows well’ and ‘has had contact with’ were treated equally. 
• These scores were translated to percentages.  So a businessperson would know 
0-100% of the politicians in a certain group. 
• These percentage scores were standardized, so that businesspeople who knew 
the same proportion of a certain group as the mean for the whole sample 
scored zero.  Scores above and below the mean are denominated in standard 
deviations. 
• Each businessperson’s bias towards one group over another was calculated by 
subtracting their standardized score for each group from their score for the 
other groups.  This produced six comparative scores. 
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• Finally, the six comparative scores were simply added up.  The larger the 
score, the more exclusive, are the connections of a businessperson. 
 
Unfortunately, this measure cannot distinguish serial monogamy from polygamy, but 
it can distinguish these two categories of unfaithfulness from firms following a 
marriage strategy.  Those with above the mean scores on the exclusivity measure were 
classified as married and those below the mean were classified as unfaithful.  This 
measure may be affected by the timing of the survey.  In mid-1998 the mainstream 
right had just returned to power in the September 1997 election after four years 
without any parliamentary representation.  Therefore, the measure may substantially 
underestimate the number of exclusive firms, since there are likely to big differences 
between connections to the center, left and peasants on the one hand and connections 
to the right on the other hand.  For this reason, we conducted all of our analyses twice: 
firstly, including the right wing, and, secondly, excluding the right wing.  In the three 
models reported below, the exclusion of the right wing made no substantive 
difference. 
 
 
In the previous sections, we have assumed that one relationship will be optimal for all 
firms and that all firms are free to choose this relationship.  This was a valid 
simplification for the presentation of variables, which vary from political system to 
political system rather than from firm to firm.  Obviously, a range of variables might 
influence the differential optimality of relationships within one political system and 
the freedom of firms to choose the optimal relationship.  These can be divided into 
characteristics of the managers themselves (personal-level) and characteristics of their 
firms (firm-level).  Firstly, we identify relevant personal-level variables.  Common 
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educational background is a classic concern of elite studies (Mills 1959; Suleiman 
1979).  In the Polish context, only one institution seems like a plausible candidate for 
an enduring elite network, which might encompass the political and business spheres.  
This is the Warsaw School of Economics, known in the communist era as the Central 
School of Planning and Statistics.  The universities are too large and provide too small 
a proportion of the business and political elites (Wasilewski and Pawlak 1999, p. 54) 
 
The next two variables are staples of the sociology of the business elite, and basically 
aim to capture the ‘breadth’ of a businessperson’s experience and contacts (Useem 
1984).  Firstly, there is the number of directorships on supervisory boards held by the 
respondents.  Secondly, there is membership of a business organization.  In Poland, 
and elsewhere, both firms and individuals can be members of such organizations.  
Therefore, it can be thought of as either a personal or a firm-level variable.   
 
The continuation and adaptation of communist-era networks is a dominant theme of 
post-communist sociology (Domański 2000; Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley 1998, 
Stark and Bruzst 1998), and an important issue in post-communist politics.  Since 
many opposition leaders were previously members of the communist party, and since 
many party members joined the oppositionist Solidarity union, a more subtle 
measurement of “communism” is used , which considers only membership after 1981.  
At this time, many people left the party because of the imposition of martial law and 
because they felt a stronger identification with the opposition than with the regime.  
This variable should identify potential membership in a relatively meaningful post-
communist network.   
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We also include membership of youth organisations.  Youth organisation membership 
was seen as a ‘fast-track’ route into elite positions in the communist era 
(Kolankiewicz and Lewis 1988, p. 79).  There were both communist youth 
organisations and an independent youth organisation founded in 1981.  Finally, we 
include age as a control variable, since older people may well have had more 
opportunities to build a greater number and variety of contacts.   
 
Our model also incorporates firm level-variables.  The first of these is income in 
millions of Polish Zlotys.  The size of a firm is a very obvious influence on its 
political prospects.  The second is a variable that measures ownership by the State 
Treasury or another state institution or state-owned firm. It classifies firms with less 
than ten per cent state ownership as private, those with eleven to seventy four per cent 
state ownership as mixed and those with seventy five to one hundred per cent state 
ownership as state-owned. This tripartite classification has a strong theoretical and 
empirical basis in the literature on post-communism (Schoenman 2005; Staniszkis 
1998; Stark and Bruzst 1998).  Theoretically, most of the arguments focus on the 
opportunities for arbitrage afforded by a position in both the public and private sectors 
in a political economy with widely available narrowly focused favours and serious 
regulatory and corporate governance weaknesses. 
 
There is no such literature on foreign ownership, which is treated as a straightforward 
interval-level variable.  The fourth firm-level variable is policy orientation. Policy 
orientation distinguishes those firms, which report that contemporary state policy is 
the most important influence on their firm, from those which report that either the 
domestic or the world economy is more important to their firm’s development. This 
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variable is almost a direct measure of the firm’s perceived need to lobby, and is 
therefore a very strong control for tests of the effects of certain characteristics on 
lobbying behavior.   The final variable is again membership of a business 
organization.  As mentioned above, sometimes businesspeople are members of such 
organizations, and, in other cases, the firm itself is the member.   
 
Data Analysis 
Distribution of Relationships 
We find that a full fifty per cent of our sample was engaged in exclusive relations 
with a party. Thirty six per cent were unfaithful. Only fourteen per cent of 
respondents were abstinent. However, if right-wingers are excluded from the 
calculations, forty two per cent are exclusive, while forty four per cent fall into the 
unfaithful category. There were five missing cases. Regardless of whether we include 
or exclude right-wingers, this finding means that eighty-six percent of Polish firms in 
our sample have relations of exchange with a political party. Depending on whether 
politicians on the right are included, at least half of those firms have ties to only one 
party over time, either because this maximizes their chance of receiving benefits, they 
fear the possible costs of unfaithfulness, or they have no other options. Thirty-six 
percent of the respondents, instead, are able to align with multiple parties, at the same 
time or over time.3 
 
The relatively small numbers of abstinent firms is consistent with our assumption of 
the availability of narrow favours.  However, the figures do not clearly adjudicate 
between marriage and unfaithfulness.   Depending on whether the right-wingers are 
included or not, the modal relationship is either marriage or unfaithfulness.  We are 
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not arguing that the modal relationship is necessarily the most successful one.  There 
may well be factors that affect the optimality of relationships and firms’ ability to 
choose the optimal relationship.  In order to investigate this possibility, we try to 
predict the category of relationship using personal and firm-level variables.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table two shows a multinomial logit model of the distribution of relationships 
employing all of the personal and firm-level variables.  In comparing marriage to 
abstinence and unfaithfulness to abstinence, the model finds only personal-level 
variables to be important (including the ambiguously categorized business association 
membership).  The three significant variables are membership of a youth organization 
in the past, number of current memberships of supervisory boards and present 
membership of a business organization.  Multinomial logit models are difficult to 
interpret directly.  Therefore, in table three, we present the results of simulations 
designed to reveal the effects of these three variables. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
All of the three variables drastically reduce the likelihood of abstinence.  Youth 
organization and supervisory board membership only marginally distinguish between 
marriage and unfaithfulness.  However, membership of a business organization, 
makes a firm much more likely to be married than unfaithful. 
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The significant variables are most effective in explaining the difference between the 
minority of abstinent firms and the rest, which do have relationships with politicians. 
It is remarkable that none of the firm-level characteristics are significant.  The model 
suggests that none of these obvious differences between firms influence firms’ choice 
of relationship or their ability to develop different types of relationship.   
 
We interpret the importance of the personal-levels as significant constraints on the 
ability of the firms to develop relationships with political parties.  Nonetheless, the 
significance of supervisory boards and business organizations suggests that these 
constraints can be overcome.  Business organizations are generally open to all comers 
and determined and resourceful firms can buy their way into, or manoeuvre 
themselves on to, the boards of other firms.   The importance of the youth 
organisation variable indicates a formidable constraint on firms, which might want to 
develop political relationships.  Clearly, managers with a lifelong tradition of elite 
networking give any firm a significant head start.  Unlike the other two variables, the 
absence of such managers cannot be remedied without drastic changes in personnel at 
the top of the firm.  Membership of youth organizations is a particularly Polish, or 
perhaps post-communist variable, but it is also simply a local operationalisation of a 
long-standing emphasis of elite sociology.  It is the equivalent of elite education or 
club membership in other countries. 
 
Lobbying Activity  
The relationships of our typology are not important unless they have political 
consequences.  Next, we investigate whether they can explain firms’ participation in 
lobbying.  Eighty per cent of respondents reported lobbying activity in the last few 
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years (nine missing cases).   This time, our equation again includes the firm-level 
variables, but replaces the personal level ones with our typology of relationships, 
since it is the importance of these relationships we are testing in this article. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
In table four, we show a logistic regression model of lobbying activity.  None of the 
variables, including the relationships, are significant.  While it might be expected that 
the abstinent firms, not having developed political relationships, would be less likely 
to lobby, this result can plausibly be interpreted in the context of the results reported 
in the previous section.  While some firms may have chosen abstinence, others may 
well have been constrained in their efforts to develop relationships, by the absence of 
supervisory board memberships, past youth organization membership and business 
association membership.  Such firms may have felt the need to go ahead and lobby 
even in the absence of relationships with party politicians. 
 
Lobbying Success 
Our final equation seeks to explain the reported success of lobbying efforts.  
Respondents could evaluate the result of their lobbying as ‘without effect’, ‘partially 
successful’ or ‘successful’.  Thirty three per cent reported ‘without effect’; forty three 
per cent ‘partially successful’ and twenty four per cent ‘success’ (twenty seven 
missing cases).  Again, our equation contains the relationship and firm-level variables. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
  24 
In table five, we present an ordinal logit model of lobbying success.  Three variables 
are significant: income, marriage, and unfaithfulness.  Unsurprisingly, the size of the 
enterprise, as proxied by income, increases the likelihood of successful lobbying.  It is 
much more remarkable that all of the other economic variables are insignificant.  
These variables are staples of both the general literature on business lobbying and the 
literature on post-communist political economy.   
 
The significance of the marriage and unfaithfulness variables indicates that abstinence 
is politically ineffective.  The lower success rate of the abstinent firms bolsters the 
interpretation of abstinent participation in lobbying given in the last section.  
Abstinent firms have lobbied and failed.  An important reason for this may be the 
constraints on developing the political relationships, which are associated with 
lobbying success.   
 
The model itself does not allow a direct comparison of the effects of marriage and 
unfaithfulness.  Therefore, in Table Six, we present the results of simulations 
designed to reveal the effects of different relationships.  The odds ratios show that 
unfaithful firms are far more likely to be successful lobbyists than married firms.  
They are both more likely to report success than failure, and more likely to report 
success than partial success.  The ratio of the odds of an unfaithful firm reporting 
success versus failure to the odds of a married firm reporting success over failure is 
1.4.  The ratio of the odds of an unfaithful firm reporting success versus partial 
success to the odds of a married firm reporting success versus partial success is 1.7.   
In effect, the model demonstrates that exclusivity matters in party-firm relations.  
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Unfortunately, however, we are unable to tell whether these unfaithful firms are serial 
monogamists or polygamists.  Nonetheless, the equation shows that different types of 
party-firm relationships are highly consequential.  The existing literature has not 
distinguished between these relationships and, consequently, has overlooked a vital 
element of success in Polish party-firm relations.  The results are consistent with our 
prediction that serial monogamy would be the most effective party-firm relationship 
in Poland.  Married firms are disadvantaged in one out of every two parliaments and 
are therefore less likely to report successful lobbying over the last number of years.  
Our general theory has correctly predicted the rank order for lobbying success of the 
three relationships that we can measure in Poland.   
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Conclusions 
Existing approaches to business-government relations, corruption and political 
finance (with the exception of the specialised American literature on Political Action 
Committees) elide the issue of the exclusivity of party-firm relations. Our typology 
captures the presence or absence of exclusive relations between a firm and parties at a 
point in time and over time.  Making two relatively uncontroversial assumptions, we 
have presented a general theory that predicts which relationship should dominate in a 
given political system.  We have conducted a preliminary test of our theory with 
Polish survey data.  Our equation for the distribution of relationships suggested that 
there are significant constraints on the ability of firms to develop relationships with 
politicians.  We did not uncover a link between the different relationships and 
lobbying activity.  However, our data demonstrate that relationships do matter for 
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successful lobbying, and this is surely the most important of our models.  The results 
for lobbying success are entirely consistent with theory’s prediction.  Unfortunately, 
however, our data is unable to distinguish between firms that switch between parties 
and those, which simultaneously maintain relationships with a number of parties.  
 
We have not provided a complete model of business lobbying in Poland, or anywhere 
else, and, indeed, this is not what we set out to do.  We have presented and justified a 
new typology of party-firm relations. Furthermore, we have shown that it is both 
measurable, and, crucially, that it has substantial consequences for our understanding 
of the relationships between firms and parties.  Obviously, this result is based on 
survey research conducted in Poland and our exact selection of controls was 
dependent on contextual knowledge.  Nonetheless, our theory is rooted in the logic of 
capitalist democracy, not the specificities of the Polish case.  As such, we believe that 
we have proposed and begun to test a promising hypothesis for the explanation of a 
vital relationship in all capitalist democracies. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses 
 Fused institutions Divided institutions 
Dominant party Marriage Marriage 
Alternation Serial monogamy Polygamy 
Unpredictability Polygamy Polygamy 
 
  28 
 
Table 2:  Multinomial Logit Model of Likelihood of Relationship 
Variable Coefficient (Robust Standard Error) 
Marriage 
Warsaw School of Economics 0.70679 (1.06777) 
Supervisory boards 1.81117 (0.48075)** 
Business Organization 4.89448 (1.53434)** 
Communist Party (after 1981) -0.37432 (1.15973) 
Youth Organization 2.6546 (1.0929)* 
Age -0.01456 (0.07034) 
Income 0.00004 (0.00007) 
Mixed Ownership -1.74408 (1.40134) 
State Ownership 0.40312 (1.36366) 
Foreign Ownership 0.00645 (0.01864) 
Policy Orientation -0.16442 (1.2568) 
Constant -1.95812 (3.84975) 
Unfaithfulness 
Warsaw School of Economics 0.42473 (1.00795) 
Supervisory boards 1.80765 (0.4588222)** 
Business Organization 3.11964 (1.53008)* 
Communist Party (after 1981) -0.19696 (1.13677) 
Youth Organization 2.76248 (0.99206)** 
Age -0.03981 (0.06672) 
Income 0.0001  (0.00007) 
Mixed Ownership -2.39927 (1.34083) 
State Ownership 0.83579 (1.26737) 
Foreign Ownership 0.01183 (0.01735) 
Policy Orientation -0.21311 (1.14781) 
Constant -0.85933  (3.52741) 
Comparison Group is Abstinence 
Pseudo R² 0.2768 
Wald chi² (22 d.f)  55.41** 
N 104 
Missing 38 
Note: * significant at p<0.05 ** significant at p<0.01. 19 of 38 missing cases are missing 
income data.  Missing income data is not significantly associated with the dependent variable 
in this or any subsequent model.  Therefore, listwise deletion of cases missing income data 
does not bias the models. 
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Table 3: Effects of Variables on Probability of Marriage or Unfaithfulness 
 
Abstinent Marriage Unfaithful 
Youth organization 0.083 1.016 1.111 
Business organization 0.067 2.542 0.466 
One Supervisory Board  0.167 1.008 1.002 
Note: The figures were calculated as follows.  The probabilities of each relationship for each 
respondent were predicted from the above multinomial logit model, as if all their 
characteristics were the same as in the sample, except that ALL had the characteristic 
mentioned in the table.  Then predictions were made as if NONE had the relevant 
characteristic.   The table contains the ratio of the mean of the two sets of probabilities.   
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Table 4: Logistic Regression Model of Lobbying Activity 
Variable Odds Ratio (Robust Standard Error) 
Income 1.00026 (0.00016) 
Mixed Ownership 1.27115 (0.99179) 
State Ownership 1.58256 (1.05372) 
Foreign Ownership 1.00635 (0.00847) 
Policy Orientation 2.33355 (1.55951) 
Business Organization 0.77403 (0.43962) 
Marriage 2.79775 (2.04056) 
Unfaithfulness 1.27026 (0.90497) 
Hosmer and Lemeshow chi²  (8.d.f.) 7.98** 
Wald chi² (22 d.f) 6.51 
Pseudo R² 0.1187 
N 102 
Missing 40 
Note: * significant at  p<0.05  ** significant at p<0.01 
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Table 5: Ordinal Logit Model of Lobbying Success 
Variable Coefficient (Robust Standard Error) 
Income 0.00012 (0.00004)** 
Mixed Ownership -0.88215 (1.02441) 
State Ownership -0.26692 (0.68491) 
Foreign Ownership -0.00495 (0.0076) 
Policy Orientation -0.02174 (0.45666) 
Business Organization 0.49218 (0.54561) 
Marriage 2.09941 (0.9847)* 
Unfaithfulness 1.96763 (0.94353)* 
  
Wald chi² (22 d.f.) 20.12* 
Pseudo R² 0.1593 
N 63 
Missing 43 
Note: * significant at p<0.05 ** significant at p<0.01.  27 of 43 missing cases are 
missing data on lobbying success. 
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Table 6: Comparison of Effects of Marriage and Unfaithfulness 
Odds Ratio Success v Failure Partial Success v Failure 
Success v Partial 
Success 
Unfaithfulness v 
Marriage 1.419 0.804 1.68 
Note: The figures were calculated as follows.  The probabilities of each relationship for each 
respondent were predicted from the above ordinal logit model, as if all their characteristics 
were the same as in the sample, except that ALL had the characteristic mentioned in the 
table.  Then predictions were made as if NONE had the relevant characteristic.   Next, the 
ratio of the mean of the two sets of probabilities was calculated.   These ratios formed the 
basis for the calculation of the odds of lobbying results for the two relationships.  It is the 
ratios of the odds calculations that are shown above.   
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Appendix 
List of Political Leaders from Elite Survey 
Balcerowicz, Leszek Freedom Union 
Bielecki, Czesław Solidarity Electoral Action 
Borowksi, Marek Democratic Left Alliance 
Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz Democratic Left Alliance 
Geremek, Bronisław Freedom Union 
Goryszewski, Henryk Peasant Party 
Kaczmarek, Wiesław Democratic Left Alliance 
Kaczyński, Jarosław Solidarity Electoral Action 
Krzaklewski, Marian Solidarity Labor Union 
Kwaśniewski, Aleksander Democratic Left Alliance 
Lewandowski, Janusz Freedom Union 
Miazek, Ryszard Peasant Party 
Miller, Leszek Democratic Left Alliance 
Pawłak, Waldemar Peasant Party 
Pol, Marek Union of Labor 
Rokita, Jan Maria Solidarity Electoral Action 
Siwiec, Marek Democratic Left Alliance 
Suchocka, Hanna Freedom Union 
Syryjczyk, Tadeusz Freedom Union 
Tomaszewski, Janusz Solidarity Electoral Action 
Walendziak, Wiesław Solidarity Electoral Action 
Wałęsa, Lech Christian Democracy of the Third Republic 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 Party factions can also be important interlocutors of firms, and probably merit a separate treatment 
from political parties.  Nonetheless, our concept and measure of exclusivity does not demand an 
association with a party as a whole.  Our approach assumes that if a firm is associated with a faction or 
factions of a party, it is associated with a party.  However, our approach does not help understand the 
situation in which firms calculate whether to form exclusive relations with one faction in a party or 
relations with more than one faction in a party. 
2
 Although Aleksander Kwaśniewski formally left his party on assuming the presidency, we do not 
count periods of SLD/Kwaśniewski rule as cohabitation.   
3
 We are conscious of the possible bias introduced by the use of  survey data based on the level of 
acquaintance of prominent members of Polish politics and business. One would expect prominent 
businesspeople and politicians to know each other, and one might well expect high levels of 
unfaithfulness as a result. In fact, this bias underscores the importance of our findings, because the 
opposite is true in the Polish case. Against all expectations, there is a decisive and politically dictated 
pattern to the relationships of knowing.  
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